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THE NEW DOCTRINE CONCERNING CONTRACTS IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
S a covenant in restraint of a particular trade and unlimited as
to space against public policy and therefore void and unen-
forceable? Long ago an English judge, in speaking of the
making of contracts, protested against arguing too strongly upon
public policy. "It is a very unruly horse, and, when once you get
astride it, you never know where it will carry you."1 Right he was
and is, and the judge who would keep his saddle must be a good
rider, for the horse shies badly on the way at every new condition
in trade and commerce, occasioned by recent developments in steam
and electricity and their increasing use as agencies in communica-
tion and transportation. A rule of law is no sooner announced
on the subject of public policy than we find by judicial determina-
tion that the rule is no longer adapted to the altered condition of
things.
No class of contracts illustrates this more forcibly than contracts
in restraint of trade. The decisions of courts upon the policy of the
law regarding such contracts and as to what is and what is not a
reasonable limitation as to time and space are truly bewildering.
We do not intend to discuss, pr even refer to many of the older
cases-and there are many on the subject-but to observe the
judicial tendencies in the last few years in relation to the contracts
in restraint of trade wherein the restraint is practically unlimited
as to space, and to note how far the courts have veered away from
rules long regarded as settled l.aw; and followed what has been
termed the "new doctrine."
Until quite recently it was the settled rule in England and this
country that the restraint might be unlimited as to time but could
not be unlimited as to space, and that a contract not to carry on
a particular trade anywhere within the Kingdom of England was
unlimited as to space and therefore unreasonable. By analogy
it has been repeatedly held in this country that a covenant not
to carry on a particular trade any where in a given state is unreason-
able and void.
The policy of the law-served by requiring that the covenant
in restraint should be limited as to space is found stated 'in the
resolution of the couit in the leading case of Mitchel v. Reynolds,
2
I Burrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish (1824), 2 Bing. 229.
21 P. Williams z8z; i Smith's Leading Cases 172.
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wherein the reasonableness of a covenant not to carry on the trade
of a baker within a given parish for five years was before the
court. The covenant was sustained. PARKZ.R, C. J., later Lord
Macclesfield, in speaking of the policy involved in contracts in
general restraint of trade said: "General restraints are all void
whether by bond , covenant, or promise, with or without consider-
ation, and whether it be of the parties own trade or not." The
reasons given for this rule are: "The mischief which may arise
from them; first, to the party by the loss of his livelihood and sus-
tenance of his family; second, to the public by depriving it of a
useful member. Another reason is the great abuses these volun-
tary restraints are liable to; as for instance from corporations,
who are perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in trade and
to reduce it into as few hands as possible. * * * A contract not
to trade in any part of England, though with consideration, is
void; for there is something more than presumption against it,
because it can never be useful to any man who restrains another
from trading in all places, though it may be to restrain him from
trading in some, unless he intends a monopoly which is a crime."
We quote these doctrines for they sound reasonable and whole-
some and that we may not forget them in considering recent cases.
Mitchel v. Reynolds is no longer good law, since the decision
handed down in the Nordenfelt case. -The facts of this case are
too well known to call for any extended discussion of them.
Nordenfelt, in consideration of 237,000 pounds in cash paid, and
5o,ooo pounds of paid up shares in a company, had covenanted
with the company that he would not, during the term of twenty-
five years, "engage, except on behalf of the company, either
directly or indirectly, in the trade or business of a manufacturer of
guns, gun mountings or carriages, gun powder explosives or am-
munition, * * * * * carried on by the company." The question
came before the House of Lords on appeal from an order of the
Court of Appeals granting an injunction against a violation of
the covenant. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. It
was argued that the covenant, being in general restraint of trade
and unlimited in respect to area, was therefore void. The House
of Lords held that the covenant, though unrestricted as to space,
was not wider than was necessary for the protection of the com-
pany nor injurious to the public interests of the country, and was
therefore valid. LoRD HIRSCH4IJ, conceded that it had been re-
garded as the established common law of England that such a
a (1894) 19 App. Cas. (H. L.) 53S-
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general covenant could not be supported. He then said: "My
Lords, it appears to me that a study of LoRD MAccLsv .ILD's
judgment will show that, if the conditions which prevail at present
had existed in his time, he would not have laid down a hard and
fast distinction between general and particular restraint, for the
reasons by which he justified that distinction would have been
unfounded in point of fact. Whether the cases, in which a general
covenant can now be supported, are to be regarded as exceptions
from the rule, which I think was long recognized as established,
- or whether the rule is to be treated as inapplicable to the altered
conditions which now prevail, is probably a matter of words rather
than of substance. The latter is perhaps the sounder view. When
once it is admitted that, whether the covenant be general or par-
ticular, the question of its validity is alike determined by the con-
sideration whether the existence of it is necessary for the pro-
tection of the covenantee. The distinction between general and
particular restraints ceases to be a distinction in point of law. I
think that a covenant entered in'to in connection with the sale of the
good will of a business must be valid where-the full benefit of the
purchase cannot be otherwise secured to the purchaser." * * * * *
It seems to be impossible to doubt that it is shown that the cove-
nant is not wider than is necessary for the protection of respondents.
The facts speak for themselves. If the covenant embraces any-
thing less than the whole of the United Kingdom, it is obviously
nugatory. The olly customers of the respondents must be found
amongst the governments of this and other countries, and it would
not practically be material to them whether the business were
carried on in one part of the United Kingdom or another."
It is evident that the peculiar and unusual facts of this case
render it -of little value as a precedent in ordinary trade contracts,
but the Lords discussed at length the law of the subject and an-
nounced a new doctrine based on recent changes in industrial 'con-
ditions.
LoRD ASHBOURNt said: "Each case has had to be considered
on its own facts. It is really impossible to divide all cases into
the two categories of covenants in general and partial restraint
of trade requiring distinct treatment and needing different policies.
However it is accomplished, the law must work in harmony with
the requirements of the times and must advance and develop with
the growth of our national life and institutions. * * * I do not re-
gatd the distinctions of any practical importance, because, as in the
present case, the inquiry as to the validity of all covenants in restraint
of trade must, I am disposed to think, now ultimately turn upon
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whether they * * * exceed what is necessary for the fair protection
of the covenantees."
LoRD Moams expressed himself on this point as follows: "The
weight of authority up to the present time is with the proposition
that general restraint of trade, where unnecessary, is void. It
appears, however, to me that the time for a new departure has
arisen and that it should be now authoritatively decided that there
should be no difference in the legal considerations which would in-
validate an agreement either in general or in particular restraint
of trade."
This decision has been followed in recent cases in England.4
In the case of Lamson Pneumatic Tube Company v. Phillips' the
defendant had agreed that he should not engage for five years in
the Eastern Hemispher6 in any business similar to the business
then or which might at any time during the continuance of that
agreement, or any extension thereof, be carried on by the plain-
tiff company. In view of the nature of the business and its pos-
sibilities, the restrictive covenant was sustained.
It was conceded that the limitation as to space in this kind of
contracts is valid whether the limitation be general or particular,
provided it be no more than is necessary to afford the covenantee
reasonable protection.
It seems to be the established rule in England that, a person in
a contract of sale of his business and its good will may bind him-
self by a covenant not to carry on the business anywhere, pro-
vided the court decides that such a covenant is necessary to the
protection of the property purchased and its business possibilities.
The monopolistic tendencies of such a covenant are no longer re-
garded seriously.
The courts of New York have, in the past few years, gone
further than the courts in any other of the United States in sus-
taining this class of contracts. In Noble v. Bates5 the court held
a covenant in restraint of trade, generally throughout the state,
to be void, but otherwise of a covenant not to trade in a
particular place, and for a particular time. This is not the law of
that state since the decision in the Diamond Match Com'any case."
In this case the defendant, who was engaged in the manufacture
and sale of friction matches in New York and throughout the states
and territories, sold his manufactory, stock, and good will of the
'Dowden v. Pook E[9o4J, a y. B. 4S. Lamson Pneumatic Tube Company v. Phillips
(1904), 91 L. T. R. 363 . 4dmundson v. Render (x9o6), 93 L. T. R. 124.
5(1827), 7 Cow. 307.
G (x887), Diamond Match Company v. Reeber, zo6 N. Y. 473.
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business to a purchasing corporation and covenanted with the
purchaser and its assigns that he would not engage in such manu-
facture or sale except in the service of the 'purchasing company
within the states and territories, except Nevada and Montana.
In an action to restrain the defendant from engaging in the manu-
facture or sale of friction matches in violation of his covenant,
the court held that the doctrine of the common law that contracts
in general restraint of trade are void had been modified, if not
abrograted, and intimated that a covenant in general restraint of
trade, where the restraint was coextensive only with the interests
to be protected and the benefits to be conferred, was not against the
policy of the law. ANDRvws, J. said: "The boundaries of the
state are not those of trade and commerce, and business is restrain-
ed within no such limits. The country as a whole, is that of
which we are citizens and our duty and allegiance are due both
to the state and to the nation. Nor is it true that, as a general
rule, a business established here cannot extend beyond the state
nor that it can be successfully established outside of the state.
There are trades and employments, which from their nature are
localized, but this is not true of the manufacturing industries in
general. We are unwilling to say that the doctrine as to what is a
general restraint of trade depends upon state lines, and we cannot
say that the exception of Nevada and Montana are colorable
merely. The rule itself is arbitrary, and we are not disp6sed
to put such a construction upon this contract as will make the con-
tract in general. restraint of trade, when upon its face it is only par-
tial."
To the objection that the object of this contract was to create
a monopoly it was said that "such contracts do not create monopo-
lies. They confer no option of exclusive privileges. If contracts
in general restraint of trade, where the trade is general, are void
as tending to monopolies, contracts in partial restraint, where the
trade is local, are subject to the same objection, because they de-
prive the local community of the services of the covenantor in the
particular trade or calling and prevent him from becoming a coin-
petitor with the covenantee."
From the facts stated in the opinion it appears that in this case
the plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation, bought defendant's busi-
ness in the City of New York at some $46,ooo. Part of the con-
sideration was paid in cash and the balance in stock in the Diamond
Match Company. The transaction was a part of a scheme to
give to the company a monopoly of the match business, and the
covenant in question was to strengthen and render the scheme
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more effective. The court, however, declined to see the monopo-
listic purpose.
A similar contract with the same company came before the
Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Richardson v. Buhl.T
The Diamond Match Company bought of The Richardson Match
Company of Detroit its business of manufacturing matches and
paid for the same in the stock of the Diamond Match Company.
In the contract of sale the Richardson Company had covenanted
to and with the Diamond Match Company "that it will not at any
time within twenty years from the date hereof, directly or indirect-
ly, engage in the manufacture or sale of friction matches, * * * *
in the state of Michigan or any where else where its doings so may
conflict with the business and interests of the Diamond Match Com-
pany." The question before the court arose out of differences
between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to their rights as be-
tween themselves, arising out of this contract. Of its own motion
the court took up the consideration of this contract of merger of
corporate interests; reviewed the origin a'nd business methods of
the Diamond Match Company and denounced the contract in no
uncertain terms.
CHAMPLAIN, J. said: "There is no doubt that all the parties to
this suit were active participants in effecting the combination called
the Diamond Match Company and that the present dispute grew
out of that transaction and was the fruit of the scheme by which
all competition in the manufacture of matches was stifled, oppo-
sition in the business crushed, and the whole business of the country
in that line engrossed by the Diamond Match Company. Such a
vast combination as has been entered into under-the above name
is a menace to the public. Its object and direct tenidency is to
prevent free and fair competition and control of prices through-
out the national domain. It is no answer to say that this monopoly
has in fact reduced the price of friction matches. That policy
may have been necessary to crush competition. The fact exists
that it rests with the discretion of this company at any time to
raise the price to an exorbitant degree. Such combinations have
frequently been condemned by courts as unlawful and against public
policy. In his opinion in this case SHERWOOD, J. writes along the
same line a scathing arraignment of the Diamond Match Company
and its attempt through coritracts in restraint of trade to destroy
competition and to secure a monopoly of one of the necessities of
life. It is no answer to say that the price of a commodity has
7 (1889), 77 Mich. 632.
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been reduced through combination and that thereby the public has
been benefited. It is power in the hands of a few to control the
supply and demand and the Price of necessities, that menaces the
public and is destructive to individual enterprise and against the
policy of the law. The Diamond Match Company in New York
and the Michigan case involving the contracts of the same company
are interesting by way of comparison. The contracts relate to the
same subject matter, are quite alike in their provisions and each
contains a covenant that the c6venafitor shall not engage in the bus-
iness of the manufacture or sale of matches within certain territor-
ies. In the New York case the restraining covenant applies to the
entire United States except the territories of Montana and Nevada,.
a colorable attempt to comply with a well known rule of law. In
the Michigan case the covenant was not to engage'in the manufac-
ture or sale of matches in the State of Michigan or any where else,
"where the doing so may conflict with the business interests" of the
covenantee. This covenant in itself and alone is more reasonable
than the former. Its operation* is confined to the good will .of the
business of the covenantor, which by stipulation may pass as an
incident to the sale of any business. In the former case, however,
the restraining clause applies -to the entire United States except
Montana and Nevada without reference to the territory covered
by the business sold. It was an attempt to secure by contract the"
business developed by the covenantor and to remove him as a com-
petitor, not only from the field then occupied by him, but also from
any other field into which he might enter anywhere within the Un-
ited States. This covenant was unreasonable in that it extended far
beyond the adequate protection to the business purchased, unless
it be conceded that the monopoly of all possibilities of business de-
velopment is lawful. Later cases in New York are in accord with
the Diamond Match Company case."
The early rule of law on this subject in the State of Massachus-
etts,. and the reason for it were dearly stated in Alger v. Thacher,9
The defendant had given his bond, conditioned that he should
never carry on or be concerned in founding iron. MoRToN,
J., in speaking of the unreasonableness of contracts in general re-
straint of a particular trade or business, said "i. Such contracts in-
jure the parties making them, because they diminish their means
of procuring livelihoods and a competency for their families. They
.8 Leslie v. Lorillard, nzo N. Y. Sig. Wood v. Whitehead, x65 N. Y. 54S. Cum-
mings v. Union Blue Stone Company, z64 N. Y. 401. See Angelica jacket Company
v. Angelica" (i9o6), 121 Mo. App. 226.
9 (z831), z9 Pick. 5z.
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tempt improvident persons, for the sake of present gain, to deprive
themselves of the power to make future acquisitions, and they ex-
pose such persons to imposition and oppression. 2. They tend to
deprive the public of the services of mal in the employment and
capacity in which they may be most useful to the community as
well as to themselves. 3. They discourage industry and enterprise
and diminish the products of ingenuity and skill. 4. They prevent
competition and enhance prices. 5. They expose the public to all
the evils of monopolies and this is especially applicable to wealthy
companies and large corporations, who have the means, unless re-
strained by law, to exclude rivals, monopolize business and engross
the market. Against evils like these, wise laws protect individuals
and the public, by declaring all such contracts void." It is difficult
to see just how the improved conditions of modem times in trade
and commerce have rendered these objections less forceful. This
case was the law of Massachusetts for over fifty years. In Bishop
v. Palmern 0 a covenant not to carry on business in manufacturing
or dealing in bed quilts or comfortables for five years, without any
limitation as to space, was adjudged to be illegal and void, as being
in restraint of trade, and for the reasons stated in Alger v. Thatch-
er, supra. It is said that recent changes in business conditions ren-
der the old rule inapplicable. In the United Shoe Machinery Com-
pany v. KimballP the defendants, engaged in manufacturing and
dealing in needles, awls, drivers, and similar articles, sold out their
business to the plaintiffs and covenanted not to engage in the bus-
iness any where for fifteen years. Speaking of this covenant,
KNOWLTON, C. J., said: "The law 'on this point as laid down in early
times has been materially changed by recent decisions. Formerly
it seems to have been held that a provision for the general restraint
of any person in his trade was necessarily invalid. But in
this commonwealth 'and in other jurisdictions this is no longer the
law." Then after stating the modem rule, he adds: "Under this
rule in conceivable cases a covenant may be valid which is unlim-
ited both in time and space. This is held by unanimous decisions
of the House of Lords in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns
and Amunition Company (1894) i A. C. 535. The reasoning in
the later American cases leads to the same result."1 2
10 (1888), 146 Mass. 469. Gamewell Fire Alarm Company v. Crane, 16o Mass. So.
1 (907) 193 Mass. 351.
2Citing the following: Ielie v. Lorillard, izo N. Y. Sig. Wood v. Whitehead
Brothers Company, 165 N. Y. S4S. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Company, 13o U. S.
396, 409. Oakdale Manufacturing Company v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484. Bancroft v. Union
1 mbossing Company, 72 N. H. 402. National gnameling & Stamping Company v.
Haberman, x2o Fed. 415.
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In answer to the objection that such contracts tend to create mo-
nopolies it is said in this case: "The mere fact that a contract looks
to the withdrawal of the competition of one of the parties to it does
not render the contract invalid. Ordinarily, with the present
methods of conducting business and the freedom of communica-
tion between centers of trade and industry, such a contract does
not create a monopoly to the danger of the general public. * * * * *
If it appears that such a contract was made with the purpose of ob-
taining a monopoly and would have a direct tendency to that re-
sult, it would be looked upon with less favor." It will be observ-
ed from this case that a contract must be for the expressed pur-
pose of creating a monopoly before it is in serious danger of ju-
dicial condemnation. The old rule of public policy that it is not
the contract but its tendency which the court strikes down is either
overlooked or disregarded in Massachusetts.
The federal courts have approved of the new doctrine. In Ore-
gon Steam Navigation Company v. Winsor1e 3, before the Supreme
Court of the United States, Justice BRADLEY, speaking of the rule,
said: "This country is substantially one country, especially in all
matters of trade and business; and it is manifest that cases may
arise in which it would involve too narrow a view of the sub-
ject to condemn as invalid a contract not to carry on a particular
business within a particular state." The contract before the court
was sustained, notwithstanding it contained in a contract of sale
of a boat a stipulation in restraint of trade, covering waters of the
State of California and the Columbia River and its tributaries.
Again in Fowle v. Park1 4 Chief Justice FuL,,R said: Public
welfare is first considered and, if it is not involved and the re-
straint upon one party is not greater than the protection to the
other requires, the contract may be sustained. The question is
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and the
nature of the particular contract involved in it, the contract is or is
not unreasonable. In the federal courts1 5, a restrictive covenant,
which is unlimited as to time, in area covers the entire United
States, is ancillary to the main contract, being in part consideration
of the payment of good will sold, and is not broader than is neces-
sary to save the covenantee the rights and privileges for which he
has paid, is valid and enforceable. The distinction between partial
1 o Wall 67.
11 (r888), z3! U. S. 96.
1 U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 8s Fed. 271. National Enameling & Stamp-
ing Company v. Haberman, 120 Fed. 415. See also Fleckenstein v. Fleckenstein (x9o8),
(N. J.) 7z Atl. 265; Cowaf v. Fairbrother, 118 N. C. 406; McCurry v. Gibson,
to8 Ala. 4S.
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and general restraints is no longer helpful in determining the rea-
sonableness of the restraint. If the covenant is to be avoided it
must be upon some other ground.
Many courts in the Central and Western States still follow the
old rule of law, modified somewhat; but not to the extent of ap-
proving the new doctrine.
In Hubbard v. Miller1 6 the complainant sold his business of well
driving for a consideration and agreed "not to keep well driver's
tools or fixtures and not to engage in the business of well driving
thereafter. there was no express limitation as to time or space
in the restrictive clause of the agreement, but the court found that
the facts justified the conclusion that the parties intended that the
restraint should apply only to Grand Haven and .the "adjacent
vicinity." This rendered the contract unobjectionable. In speak-
ing generally, however, of a contract in restraint of trade CHRISTI-
ANCY, J., said: "Whether it can be supported or not, depends upon
matters outside of and beyond the abstract fact of the contract or
the pecuniary consideration; it will depend upon the situation of
the parties, the nature of their business, the interests to be pro-
tected by the restriction, its effect upon the public; in short, upon all
the surrounding circumstances; and the weight or effect to be given
these circumstances is not to be affected by any presumption or
against the validity of the restriction; if reasonable and just, the
restriction will be sustained, if not it will be held void."
A few -years later the case of Beal v. Chase7 came before the
same court and an opportunity to apply the foregoing principle
arose. For many years prior to 1869 Chase had been engaged in
the printing and publishing business in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Dur-
ing this time the business had grown until it extended over the
Northwest and to many foreign countries. In 1869 Chase sold
this business, including the printing establishment, building, ma-
chinery, and copyrights, to Mr. Beal, and agreed not to engage
directly or indirectly in the business of printing and publishing in
the state of Michigan, so long as Beal should remain in the business
of printing and publishing in Ann Arbor. In a few years there-
after Chase broke the covenant by setting up a rival business in
Ann Arbor. In a suit for an injunction to compel an observance
of this contract, Chase defended on the ground that the covenant
in restraint of trade was void. The court sustained the covenant,
holding that it was not unreasonable in view of the nature and
127 Mich. 4.
IT 3z M ich- 490.
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extent of the business sold and the consideration paid. CAMP-
BEIiL, J., wrote: "Concerning the validity of the agreement, we
concur in regarding it as not unreasonable in fact, and as based on
full consideration. One of us has doubted whether it could prob-
ably include the whole state; but considering the rule to the con-
trary as somewhat arbitrary, we concur in maintaining the agree-
ment." At the time this decision was rendered it was regarded
as a departure from established rules governing contracts in re-
straint of trade. The question came before the court again ii
Western Wooden Ware Association v. Starkey,"' a Michigan firm
engaged in manufacturing tables and chairs, sold its stock and ma-
terial to an Illinois corporation engaged in a similar business in
that state, and agreed not to engage in the business again for the
period of five years in Michigan, Illinois, and six other neighbor-
ing states named, nor to allow their property in Michigan to be used
for that purpose, nor to sell their property to any one for the busi-
ness. In a suit to enjoin a violation of this contract the case of
Beal v. Chase, supra, was r.elied on, but the court said of that case
that the business sold was to be carried on as Chase had carried
it on and the property purchased devoted to the business in which
it had theretofore been used. In that respect it differed materially
from the case at bar. Of the contract before the court it was said:
"The interests of the parties alone are not the sole consideration
here. It is the duty of the court to see that the public interests
are not in any manner jeopardized. The state has the welfare of
all its citizens in keeping, and the public interest is the pole-star of
all judicial inquiries." Attention was then called to the fact that
by this contract people are thrown out of employment and deprived
of a livelihood and that no other of the citizens of Michigan are
"called in to take their places and that the business is no longer to
be carried on within the state, but to be removed out of the state.
This contract was held to be void in that it was prejudicial to the
public interest in the State of Michigan and was therefore an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade.
In Clark v. Needham19 plaintiffs were copartners, carrying on a
manufacturing business in Connecticut; the manufacture of chaplets
used in making cast iron boilers and, heavy castings. The defend-
ants were copartners carrying on a like business in Detroit, Michi-
gan. Plaintiffs and defendants had made an agreement, the plain
object of which was to close plaintiff's business of manufacturing
"(x89o), 84 MiCh. 76.
2(19oo), 125 Mich. 84.
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chaplets and to give defendants a monopoly of it. The agreement
contained a covenant to cease the manufacturing of certain articles
for one year. The restraint was unlimited as tQ territory. The
court held that the covenant was part of a scheme to create i
monopoly and was therefore void on the ground of public policy.
The case was distinguished from Beal v. Chase, supra, and the
Nordenfelt case, supra, in that the evident purpose of the contract
involved was to close up an established business and transfer a
business activity to another state to the prejudice of the citizens
of Michigan.
2 0
In Consumers' Oil Company v. Nunnemaker21 a contract, by
which one engaged in selling oil in one city bound himself to refrain
from carrying on his business in the state of Indiana, with the ex-
ception of one city, was adjudged to be unreasonable and void. It
is frequently contended that such a covenant does not tend to create
a monopoly as it withdraws from competition only the covenantor
and does not affect others. In reply to this the court .answered:
"If appellant could buy out appellee and restrict in this manner,
it might proceed to do so to each other person in the whole state
engaged in a similar business, and eventually reduce the sale of oil
in the state to comparatively few hands or possibly to its absolute
control, and thus virtually stifle legitimate competition.
22
Perhaps the most forceful objections to the new doctrine are
found in the opinion of MINSHALr, J., in Lufkin Rule Company
v. Fringeli,23 wherein it was held that where a person sells his
business and good will and agrees not to engage in the same busi-
ness in the state of Ohio nor in the United States for a period of
twenty-five years ;such an agreement is void because it necessarily
tends to create a monopoly. Even though the covenant in restraint
of trade is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the good will
purchased, the public interest is in the non-enforcement of such
an agreement. The Diamond Match Company case was referred to
and disapproved of. The monopolistic tendency of this kind of
contracts is noted: "No more effectual method could be devised
for the creation of a monopoly in any business. * * * * Among
the various methods adopted for the purpose of engrossing a par-
' (t9o8), Grand Union Tea Company v. Lewitsky, 153 Mich 244; Detroit Salt Co.
v. National Salt Co., 134 Mich. 103; Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co., 17 Okla, 231,
x5 I..R. A. (N. S.) 846, note; Southworth v. Davison (x9o8), - Minn. -, xx8 N. W.
363; Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Coal & Coke Co., 6o W. Va. So8, so L. R. A. (N. S.)
268 note.
21 (x89S), x42 Ind. 56o.
See Andrews v. Kingsbury, 2X2 Il. oo (904).
" (1898). 57 Oh. St. s96.
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ticular business this seems to have become a quite favored one,
when the business may be, and generally is, carried on by individuals
on a limited capital; for the reason, no doubt, that in such cases,
it is easier to accomplish the desired result in this way than by the
formation of a trust through which an entire business may be
carried on--each separate owner as a beneficiary of the trust re-
ceiving its, or his, proportion of the net earnings. To say in such
cases that the vendor should be bound not to carry on his business
because he has received adequate consideration for his agreement,
is no answer to the objection that the agreement tends to foster
the formation of a monopoly and is therefore against public policy."
The new doctrine is reviewed by the court at some length with the
conclusion that the changed conditions on which this doctrine is
based tend the more strongly to convince the court that in the
interest of a wise public policy, the old rule of law should be more
firmly adhered to.
2 4
The new doctrine, recognized as an abandonment of an old rule
of law, is based on new industrial and trade conditions, but it is
doubtful whether the new conditions lessen or increase the evils
which the rule is intended to prevent. Is not the spirit and reasoft
of the law still present and intensified by the increased facilities
for doing the wrong thing? We may hark back to the old cases
of Mitchel v. Reynolds in England and Alger v. lThacher in Mas-
sachusetts. It is as easy now as then for a person to lose his liveli-
hood and the subsistence of his family through an improvident con-
tract in general restraint of a particular trade. He could turn his
attention to some other line of industry then more easily than now.
Formerly it was not uncommon for a good man to be a "jack of all
trades," but in modern times every successful member of society
must specialize in some business or calling. If he does not he will
have no business worth buying, and if he does specialize he will be
wholly unfit for any other than the one he has chosen for his life
work. It is said, however, that courts should not.interfere with the
freedom of contract on any. vague notions of public policy; but
freedom of contract does not involve the right to agree not to
contract at all, nor should it justify industrial suicide.
Again by reason of the business methods of many corporate
entities, possessed of great power through large aggregations of
capital, a covenant of the kind under consideration' is more op-
pressive than formerly, but for another reason. Now a corpora-
2 To the same effect are Jones v. Jones (19o8), 70 Atl. 88; Clemons v. Meadows
(Ky.), 94 S. W. z3; Tuscaloosa Ice Manfg. Company v. Williams, r27 Ala. zio; Ander-
son v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
tion, engaged in some trade or manufacture and. seeking to control
the output and prices in a -line of business, frequently approaches
a manufacturer engaged in a rival business and, with a club in one
hand and a persuasive consideration in the other, demands that
he sell out the business he has developed, together with its good
will, and threatens him with business" depression and losses through
ruinous competition and other oppressive measures, unless he com-
plies with the demand. One of the stipulations of the contract of
sale generally insisted upon in these cases is that the manufacturer
shall not for a series of years again engage in a similar business
anywhere, or practically so. Without this stipulation the primary
purpose of the contract might be defeated. The individual manu-
facturer yields .fo the pressure, receives the consideration, and re-
tires from business. In many jurisdictions a court of equity will
enforce an observance of this stipulation and enjoin its breach. Is
not the public more interested in the breach than in the observance
of such a contract?
It is one thing to sell the good will of a business as an incident
and it is quite another to agree not to engage in a line of' business
anywhere or in states' where no good will of any appreciable value
,has been established. Business possibilities iri undeveloped ter-
ritories ought not to be a subject of sale.
One of the reasons given in support of the old rule was that
corporations were perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages
of trade and to reduce it into as few hands as possible. Have con-
ditions changed in this respect? The popular agitation and unrest
of today make answer. There is much unwise and unfounded
apprehension, but corporate greed for trade advantages is as-strong
as ever. By means of the increased facilities of communication
'and transportation of today monopolies are more easily created
and fostered than in former times, and the decisions of our courts
show that in effecting a monopoly there is no more common trade
stipulation than the objectionable" contract in general 'restraint of
trade."5
A reading of recent cases discloses the growth of a few judicial
notions-we say notions advisedly, for the ideas handed down can
not be regarded as established principles.
I. A covenant in general restraint of a particular trade, unlimited
as to both time and space, is not necessarily void. Much depends
on the nature of the business involved. If it be a profession or
trade necessarily local in character, then a covenant not to carry
2See Oakdale Manufacturing Company v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484; Anchor Electric
Company v. Hawkes, 171 3fas.. or.
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on such profession or trade anywhere within a given state is un-
reasonable and void, but, if the trade or business be general in
character, extending over several states and territories, then a cove-
nant not to carry on such business anywhere within, the area
covered by the good will of the business sold is not necessarily
ag-inst the policy of the law. The question is not concluded by
any artificial boundaries such as state lines.
2. If, however, the contract discloses a purpose on the part of
the contracting parties-to close up a business in a particular state
and to remove it to some foreign state, and this contract contains a
covenant not to carry on the-business within the former state, in
most jurisdictions,, such a contract is against the policy of the
law.3. If the covenant in restraint of trade is part of a scheme to
create a monopoly, then in some jurisdictions the covenant is void.
The difference in the decisions upon this point arises from the fact
that some courts readily see the tendency of such a covenant, while
others do not discover it, or, if they do, it is said that courts are
not concerned with the motives of contracting -parties. In the
words of AlmnzWs, J., "we are not aware of any rule of law which
makes the motive of the covenantee the test of the validity of such
a contract. On the contrary we suppose a party may regularly
purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose
of preventing competition, and ihe validity of the contract, if
supported by a consideration, will depend upon its reasonableness as
between the parties." This is well enough where only the rights
of the- contracting p'arties are involved, but when a question of
public policy arises the motive of the contracting parties is of prim-
ary concern. It is a fundamental principle in public policy that
where the object of a contract is innocent, but is designed to further
an illegal purpose, the contract is void if both parties knew of the
illegal purpose at the time the contract was entered into.
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4. Formerly the courts declined to enforce a contract in restraint
-of trade that was not upon an adequate consfderation. It is now
said that adequacy of consideration is not important but the facts,
in maiiy of the cases decided, show that the enormous consideration
paid for the covenant questioned has largely influenced the court
in sustaining it, notwithstanding the principl6 that a valuable con-
sideration, however large, does not make a bad promise good.
Uiqder the new conditions we fear that, too frequently, public policy,
that unruly horse, is up to the highest bidder.
"Anson's "Law of Contracts, xxth d., §264.
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Courts are inclining to the disposition to leave the question of
public policy 'in trade contracts to legislative determination, and
upon the subject there are many statutes in force, both federal and
state. The objection to this is that such restraining statutes are
strictly construed, and are frequently evaded and invaded. The'
public would be more adequately protected against wrong doing
by some consistent application of fundamental principles of the
common law, wherein the spirit and reason of the law is more
carefully guarded than its letter. There is occasion for regret that
the new doctrine has secured so firm a hold in the jurisprudence
of our country. The only remedy, 'unsatisfactory as it is, must
be found in statutory regulation.
JZROMI C. KNOW.LTON.
UNIVERSITY 01? MICHIGAN.
